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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates a relationship between economic governance and the dual objectives 
of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs): poverty reduction and financial viability. Using an 
unbalanced panel of 531 MFIs the important role of other institutions such as country-level 
business registry departments in facilitating targeting of poor clients is illuminated. 
Comparing the estimates of Hausman-Taylor and Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition allows 
us to scrutinize and at least partially correct the effects of both time invariant and slow 
changing endogenous variables. We find that credit information availability and lesser time in 
securing property enhances the chances of MFIs in achieving their poverty reduction 
objective. Product diversification leading to economies of scope also enables MFIs to reach 
poor clients. On the basis of the above, it is imperative for government and development 
partners to channel their efforts towards provision of an enabling atmosphere that will 
enhance the achievement of microfinance social objectives. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The discourse on poverty lending vis-à-vis financial system approaches to microfinance 
reached the consensus in the late 1990s that it is more than an either/or argument, rather the 
extent to which an institution pursues either of the goals and addresses the potential 
consequences (Rhyne, 1998). A little over a decade later, Cull et al. (2009) argued that the 
heterogeneity of MFIs indicates that the future of microfinance is unlikely to follow a single 
path. The need to identify the extent of trade-off and the multiplicity of pathways 
imperatively calls for systems of checks and balances for the operations of MFIs. Earlier 
studies (Labie, 2001; Hartaska, 2005; Coleman and Osei, 2007 and Mersland and Strøm 
2009) have explored the hypothesis of a directional causation from governance to 
microfinance objectives of outreach and profitability. In these papers, emphasis was placed 
on internal (corporate) governance indicators such as institutional board and management 
characteristics, disclosure, ownership structure and transparency. Beyond investigating the 
corporate governance effect on the objectives of MFIs, a couple of studies have explored the 
impact of some external governance structures such as regulation, auditing and market 
competition (Hartaska 2005 and Mersland and Strøm 2009). This paper subscribes to the 
notion that the complexity of multiple objectives, the heterogeneity of varied operational 
strategies and regulatory and licensing variations (formal and informal), renders the 
governance system of MFIs itself as a ‘black box’. This necessitates a detailed enquiry into 
the internal and external governance structures and their functional roles that provide required 
systems of checks and balances for MFIs. The central hypothesis of this paper asserts that 
functional governance systems cause MFIs to achieve their dual objectives of poverty 
reduction and financial viability. 
 
We offer three reasons for the need for conceptualization and estimation of external 
governance in this debate. Firstly, from a conceptual perspective, we contextualize external 
governance based on the functioning of institutions. The role of institutions in setting legal 
rules, enforcing contracts and inciting collective action both within and outside markets 
underpins the concept of economic governance (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2009). 
Conceptualizing external governance from the perspective of economic governance shifts the 
focus from a structure of systems to processes and adaptation of rules, enforcement and 
monitoring. We argue that time invariant factors (structure of systems) fail to capture the 
effect of governance on the functioning of imperfect markets such as microfinance. For 
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instance, using traditional governance indicators, such as a dummy to capture a democratic 
state or the presence of press freedom, constrains the ability to investigate causality using 
short panels. Thirdly, restricting governance to rules within the market such as regulation and 
auditing relies entirely on the MFI. That is, the decision to become a formal institution, and 
therefore regulated, in retrospect, will be positively correlated with the performance and 
future direction of the MFI. This conjecture is likely to generate a bi-causal relationship 
between MFIs’ performance and decisions for regulation and auditing. The foregoing tends 
towards both conceptualization and measurement of external governance literature in 
microfinance. 
 
In this paper, we identify external governance indicators that are exogenous to the MFIs to 
assess causality between governance and microfinance multiple objectives. We assume that 
country-level variables such as contract enforcement procedures, time required to secure 
property, credit information and voice and accountability are expected to have varying 
impacts on the outreach and financial performance objectives of MFIs. We hypothesize that 
external governance causes MFIs to reach poorer clients while internal operation is sufficient 
for financial sustainability. Our hypothesis is underpinned by a strong intuition that MFIs will 
pursue the goal of profit maximization at least as an initial step when left alone.  
 
The main finding of the study suggests that credit information availability and lesser time in 
securing property maximize the objective of poverty lending focus of MFIs. Product 
diversification leading to economies of scope also enables institutions to reach poorer clients. 
In the case of MFIs’ financial performance, while external governance systems appear to be 
unnecessary, good internal operational systems are sufficient. In Section 2, we present a 
discussion and conceptual framework of governance and the dual objectives of MFIs. In 
Section 3, we describe the data and outline our data and estimation strategies, followed by 
discussion of the findings in Section 4. Section 5 offers conclusions.  
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
 
In this section, we use the theoretical argument as a cradle for an extension of the scope of 
the relationship between governance and the dual objectives of MFIs. The social goals of 
MFIs brings on board the behavioural theory of the firm. Simon (1959) argues that disparate 
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objectives between internal stakeholders (managers, owners and workers) and other 
stakeholders, such as the government, downplay the central goal of profit maximization. In 
the context of microfinance this implies that setting and evaluating minimum standards for 
reaching poor clients and being profitable will require at least two conditions: (1) reaching a 
consensus among microfinance stakeholders, and (2) instituting a well functioning structure 
of checks and balances within a country to facilitate equal opportunities for all parties. In this 
paper we focus on the latter.  
 
Dixit’s (2009) seminal paper identifies both top-down (securing property rights and contract 
enforcement) and bottom-up (collective action) drivers of governance that facilitate economic 
activity. According to Dixit, the economic agents should have confidence that the fruit of 
their efforts will remain secured to benefit their own condition. Without this assurance, 
people lose the incentive to save and invest. The twist in the case of microfinance is the direct 
protectionist role required from government and development partners to secure the savings 
and investment of MFIs, but more especially the poor. Instituting a system to promote 
security of property in the microfinance industry should have the dual objectives of ensuring 
that MFIs loans are protected and, at the same time, their intervention targets the poorer 
segment of the population.  
 
In addition to the above, the availability and functioning of contract enforcing institutions 
complement the process of securing properties (Dixit, 2009). Thus the economic agent’s 
knowledge of the presence of an external system that ensures participating parties’ liability to 
a contract promotes trust and facilitates honest engagement. In the absence of trust and 
confidence in the other party, people remain stuck in a prisoner dilemma that freezes all 
transactions. In view of the several stakeholders in microfinance, in an event of mutual trust 
among any given set of economic agents (say MFI and client), their goal should complement 
other sets’ (say development partner and MFI) contractual goals. The significant presence of 
multiple principal-agent relationships resulting from the existence of several stakeholders in 
microfinance convolutes contract enforcement in microfinance.  
 
Thirdly, proper functioning of institutions in ensuring security of property and facilitating 
contract enforcement can only be accomplished with well structured avenues for addressing 
common goals among people. Dixit (2009) further argues that the outcome of most private 
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transactions depends on sufficient provision of public goods and the ability to minimize 
public “bads”. The elements required for collective action are the functioning of groups and 
local information on alternatives. For instance, well-informed activities of unionized workers, 
associations and consumer groups act as catalysts for seeking respective interests. The 
microfinance group lending mechanism offers clients a springboard to galvanize action for 
sufficient provision of public goods and eliminate public “bads”; however, their impact has 
not been realized beyond the group’s activities. In contrast, MFIs through their network 
associations have mobilized effort in most countries to address constraints facing the supply-
side of the industry. Collective action manifested through active consumer (microfinance 
clients) groups and MFI networks is expected to ensure a mutual achievement of the poverty 
reduction and financial sustainability objectives. 
 
The functioning of institutions securing property rights and enforcing contracts and avenues 
for collective action are expected to initially demystify unfounded stereotypes about financial 
service providers’ rigidity, exclusivity, bureaucracy, high cost of service and barriers to entry. 
This will then open the frontiers of the primary stakeholders (MFIs) to both sides of the scale 
that is wholesale fund providers and clients. Subsequently, this will ensure that MFIs set 
minimum levels of objectives based on the consent of all stakeholders that will then lead to 
an all-inclusive platform for the evaluation of performance through time. 
 
Empirically, anecdotal evidence of a breakdown of trust between owners3  and managers 
because of the multiple goals of reaching poorer clients and being profitable/sustainable has 
led to studies on the effect of corporate governance on microfinance performance. The 
motivation for these studies is the theoretical rift between managers and owners respective 
objectives of growth and profitability. In the context of MFIs, this premise has reduced the 
scope of objectives to fund providers and managers. Subsequently, the current literature 
related to governance of micro-lending practices and MFIs highlights the effects of specific 
internal governance patterns on outreach and profitability. A large majority of the literature 
focuses on internal control systems and management frameworks which are likely to affect 
either social or financial performance of MFIs (Labie, 2001; Hartaska, 2005; Coleman and 
Osei, 2007 and Mersland and Strøm 2009). Organizational and structural patterns of 
                                                           
3
 This includes development partners and governments who provide wholesale funds for on-lending. 
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corporate governance such as size, composition, representativeness of the board and duality 
of the Chief Executive Officer have been investigated (Hartaska 2005 and Mersland and 
Strøm 2009). In view of the theoretical overview discussed above and the scope of empirical 
evidence, it is imperative to investigate the effect of external governance structure and 
functioning on the outreach and profitability of MFIs. Offering evidence on the effect of 
external governance on either or both of the objectives of MFIs will set the tone for defining 
the role of other stakeholders, in particular the government.  
 
 
3. Data and Analysis 
 
3.1 Data 
 
We rely on three data sources for the empirical analysis. The main data source is the 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) which reports operational indicators of MFIs on 
an annual basis. This report is based on self reporting by the institutions; however, 
verification and authentication mechanisms are built into the procedures to ensure 
consistency and reliability of data. The other two sources are the ‘Doing Business’ and 
‘Governance’ surveys of the World Bank. Both datasets are generated annually and the latter 
captures proxy variables for the three economic governance indicators used in this study, 
namely; security of property rights, enforcement of contracts and collective action. We 
examined data for two hundred MFIs from 61 countries for the period 2004 to 2007; 
however, Because of missing data for some of the Doing Business indicators for 2004 and the 
seemingly slow rate of change over the year for most of the Governance indicators, we 
restrict the econometric analysis to 2005-2007.  
 
In view of MFIs’ double bottom-line objectives, we explore the effect of governance from the 
two perspectives of reaching poorer clients (depth of outreach) and achieving financial 
sustainability (return on assets). Both measures are standardized for comparing different 
institutions and countries. The three main explanatory variables in the study are: number of 
procedures required for contract enforcement, time required for property registration, voice, 
and accountability. Table 1 shows the measurement and interpretation of these variables. In 
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addition to these three external governance indicators, we control for the effect of the credit 
information index and regulation and other institutional characteristics.   
Table 1 
 
Variables, Description and Hypotheses 
Variables Description Hypothesis 
  
Depth of 
Outreach 
Return on 
Assets 
Depth of Outreach a Measures of outreach (extent of reaching poorer client): 
Average loan bal. per borrower / Gross National Income 
Per Capita. 
* - 
Return on Assets a Measure of Overall financial performance: (Net operating 
income, less Taxes) / Assets, average. 
- * 
Portfolio at Risk 
(30days) a 
Measure of risk: The value of all loans that have one or 
more instalments of principal past due in excess of 30days 
/ loan portfolio, gross. 
- - 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
(GLP) a 
Measure of outreach: All outstanding principals for all 
client loans 
+ + 
Operating Expense/ 
GLP a 
Measure of efficiency: Operating expense/loan portfolio, 
gross, average. 
  
Cost  Per Borrower a Measure of efficiency: Operating expense / number of 
active borrowers, average 
- - 
Yield on GLP 
Nominal a 
Measure of revenue: Interest and fees on Loan Portfolio / 
Loan Portfolio, gross, average. 
- + 
Product a  Measure of diversity of products offered by institution; = 1 
if only loans and 0 otherwise. 
+ + 
Regulated a Measure of ‘internal’ governance: Institution is regulated 
either by the central bank, ministry or some apex body. 
+/- +/- 
Age of Institution a Number of years of operation + + 
Voice and 
Accountability b 
Measures political, civil and human rights. Scores range 
from -2.5 to 2.5 with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 1. With higher values indicating respect for 
rights and opportunity to enhance denial and violation. 
+ * 
Time taken to 
Register a Property c 
Measure of ‘external’ governance: Captures the median 
duration that property lawyers, notaries or registry officials 
indicate as necessary to complete a procedure of 
registering a property. 
+/- - 
Procedures for 
Contract Enforcement 
c
 
Measure of ‘external’ governance: Number of procedural 
steps necessary to enforce commercial disputes in relevant 
courts. 
+/- - 
Credit Information 
Index c 
This measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility and 
quality of credit information available at public and private 
credit registries. The index ranges from 0 to 6 with higher 
values indicating availability of more credit information 
+ +/- 
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that shapes lending decisions. 
Sources: a – Mix Market; b – World Bank Governance Indicators and c – World Bank, Doing Business Indicators. 
 
3.2 Econometric Analysis 
 
We estimate a hypothesized functional relationship between MFI objectives (social and 
financial) and external governance using least squares. In view of the potential effect of 
lagged variables not observed, reverse causality and omitted unobservable regressors, we 
compare results of pooled, fixed and random effects, and static instrumental variable panel 
estimates. The latter is the main estimation technique used in the study as it allows for 
simultaneous investigation of both time invariant and endogenous regressors. First, the 
peculiarity of microfinance objectives that is influenced by the orientation of the institution 
justifies the use of an estimation technique that considers the effect of omitted unobservable 
regressors. Also, the potential of reverse causality is imperative in our hypothesized 
functional relationship, as some country-level experience demonstrates the joint dependence 
between better performing institutions and governance. Finally, characteristics of governance 
indicators which are fairly constant over time, leading to slow changing regressors, make it 
prudent to estimate coefficients using lags of exogenous variables in the panel setting.  
 
We run two separate regressions for each of the objectives of MFIs for the analysis. The 
general model is specified in equation 1 below as; 
 
iltiltilttilt dTDO ετγβλξα ++++=                                         1 
 
Where iltDO  represents either of the double bottom-line objectives of the depth of outreach 
or return on assets for institution i in country l and time t. We include in the model, time 
dummy dT  , vector of external governance indicators λ  and vector of institutional internal 
characteristics and credit information indexγ .  iltε  is a vector of mean-zero random errors. In 
the general set-up, the error term is assumed to capture both idiosyncratic errors µ it (time 
varying) and unobserved institution and country heterogeneity ai. The latter error is of prime 
concern in view of the reasons enumerated earlier.  
Although we estimate the general model for fixed and random effects, the econometric 
discussion is restricted to Hausman-Taylor (HT) and the Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition 
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(FEVD). While the Hausman test provides decision criteria for the choice of either fixed or 
random effects, we proceed further to explore some potential caveats in using these 
techniques. The first caveat relates to post-estimation examination of regression (panel) 
analysis including serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Secondly, we examine the effect 
of time invariant and endogenous variables. In the case of the first caution, parametric 
bootstrap and the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) are estimated to investigate the 
amount of bias in the estimated coefficients, its standard error, and other aspects of its distribution. 
 
The second caveat of panel regression is of paramount interest due to the presence of time 
invariant explanatory variables that compound the debate between the assumed strict 
exogeneity characterizing random effects and endogeneity associated with fixed effects 
estimation. In the presence of time invariant endogenous variables, the Hausman 
fixed/random effect selection is rendered redundant as the assumptions underlying each of the 
techniques are violated. For example, the use of fixed effects is hampered in an event where 
either one or more of the main covariate(s) is/are time invariant and endogenous (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2009). 
 
In the context of a short panel (small T and large N) the likelihood of regulation and licensing 
indicators remaining constant over time is high. Similarly, some institutional characteristics 
such as number of products offered remain constant over time, that is attributed to the risk 
associated with product innovation. Heterogeneity of the poor’s characteristics has expanded 
microfinance products beyond basic credit and savings. The need for product diversification 
can be endogenous to the performance of the MFI. Unlike other business enterprises, MFIs 
have yet to reach a competitive stage in most countries (Porteous, 2006).  
 
Finally, endogeneity of external governance indicators is plausible due to: (i) measurement 
error (see Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008), and (ii) bi-causality between country-level 
governance indicators and microfinance performance.  
 
The above present three types of problem (time invariant right-hand side variables, 
measurement error and/or endogeneity). Traditional panel instrumental variable estimation 
emerges as a preferred choice in correcting endogeneity associated with potential 
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measurement error of governance indicators. We explore either HT or the FEVD estimators 
depending on the correlation between time-variant/invariant variables and microfinance-
specific effect. In addition to HT and FEVD, we explore the potential effect of the three-way 
error components model in view of the fact that the institutions are grouped into different 
countries.  
 
Beginning with the HT estimator we can specify equation 2 below as;  
 
itiilililtiltilt aXXDO µλβλβξξ +++++= 22112211
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Where ξ  represent vector of time varying regressors but distinguished by (subscripts 1 and 2) 
in terms of whether they are correlated with the unobservable (ai). In our context, all the 
explanatory variables with the exception of product diversification and regulation are time-
varying regressors. β denotes the two time-invariant regressors, product diversification and 
regulation, each measured by a dummy variable. The subscripts 1 and 2 distinguish the 
endogenous time invariant variable (number of products offered by the MFI) from the 
exogenous variable, regulation. As usual all the regressors are assumed to be uncorrelated 
with the idiosyncratic error term itµ . 
 
Theoretically, HT is preferred to random effects as it tends to be less restrictive because it 
allows for some of the time varying explanatory variables to be correlated with the unit-
specific effects. While random effects estimation emerges as an obvious choice in the 
presence of time invariant explanatory variables, it is restrictive due to the strict exogeneity 
assumption. HT uses exogenous time-variant variables as instruments for endogenous time-
variant variables and exogenous time-invariant variables (where available) and the unit 
means of the exogenous time-variant variables as instruments for the endogenous time-
invariant regressors.  
 
The estimation of HT follows the following procedure. In the first stage we estimate a 
standard fixed effects model. This sweeps away both λs and ai in equation 2 above. We then 
generate the residual (includes both λs and ai and it) and take the average (over time, for each 
i) to minimize the effect of the term. Representing the estimated residuals from equation 2 
with itµ~ˆ we can specify equation 3 as: 
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 iltFEiltFEiltilt XXOD 21
~~~
~ˆ ξξµ −−=       3 
 
Where sξ have been generated from the first stage fixed effects model and itOD~ are the 
predicted values of the dependent variable. Technically, itµ~ˆ of equation 3 is made up the time 
invariant variables (λs) of equation 2. In effect the sβ in equation 2 are ascertained by running 
a regression of the averaged residual on λs using the fixed effects. The HT estimator is based 
on a transformation of the random effects (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). In sum, HT uses lags 
to estimate and correct endogeneity problem on the assumption that some of the regressors 
are uncorrelated with the errors. 
 
The transformed estimable form of equation 2 can be specified as: 
 
 
 
 
All other symbols are consistent with earlier definitions, and the additional symbol theta (θ) 
represents the adjusted covariance-variance ratio 4  of residuals of the structural form of 
equation 5.  
 
The empirical use of HT always requires an a priori identification of potential endogenous 
variables as we attempted doing earlier in the paper. In this paper two reasons are identified 
for the choice of explanatory variables that are likely to be endogenous. First, in spite of the 
breakthrough made with regards to measurement of governance indicators, Kaufman and 
Kraay (2008) call for caution in its use due to measurement error. This potential error coupled 
with the slow changing characteristics of governance issues justifies the characterization of 
governance indicators as likely endogenous variables. Secondly, in view of the pervasive 
assumption of mutuality or trade-off between financial viability and outreach in the 
microfinance literature, we subscribe to a potential bi-causality. Based on the a priori 
identification of potential endogenous variables, the HT estimation technique allocates the 
other variables to different time varying/invariant and endogenous/exogenous groups. For 
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instance, with the depth of outreach equation, the explanatory variables are categorized into: 
Time varying exogenous [Portfolio at Risk, Gross Loan Portfolio, Operating Expense, Cost 
per Borrower, Yield on Gross Loan Portfolio (Nominal) and Age of Institution]; time-
invariant exogenous variables – regulation and product diversity; and time-variant 
endogenous [Voice and accountability, Property rights, Enforcement of Contracts and Credit 
information index]. 
 
While HT appears less restrictive relative to random effects estimations, the above suggests 
some discretionary and intuitive difficulty in the empirical world due to identification of 
exogenous explanatory variables that simultaneously correlate with the endogenous variables. 
Plümper and Troeger (2004) assert that the researcher’s discretionary role in choosing 
variables that are either exogenous or endogenous largely influences the results. Again, 
Plümper and Troeger (2007) show that HT works well only when the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the errors and the unit effects are highly correlated with the endogenous 
regressors. In addition to these limitations, the other pre-requisite of a valid instrument which 
suggests correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable is practically 
shelved. While this pre-requisite provides an intuitive underpinning for employing 
instrumental variable estimation, HT solves endogeneity strictly of the functional form. In 
lieu of the foregoing, econometrically, the Hausman null hypothesis test of significant 
difference between coefficients (based on the strict exogeneity assumption) can be employed 
to determine whether estimates emerging from HT are significantly different from the fixed 
effects estimations (Baltagi, 2005).  
 
Plümper and Troeger (2004) suggest an alternative procedure to HT in view of its limitations. 
The FEVD estimation is being popularized in the comparative politics literature and since 
this paper leans towards governance issues it is imperative to align it with the current state of 
the art. In contrast to estimating a fixed effects model including time varying and time 
invariant explanatory variables in HT, the first stage estimation in FEVD runs fixed effects 
estimation on only the time varying regressors. In the second stage, we generate residuals 
from the fixed effects estimation and regress it on the time invariant variables. The rationale 
for the second stage estimation is to decompose the vector of residuals from the fixed effect 
into a part explained by the time invariant variables and an error component. Finally, to 
control for multicollinearity and degrees of freedom a third stage, pooled least squares 
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regression including all explanatory time variant variables, time invariant variables and the 
unexplained part of the fixed effects residual vector, is estimated. Theoretically, the 
overarching advantage of FEVD over HT is the non-requirement for a priori knowledge of 
correlation between the explanatory variables and the unit-specific effects. 
 
We modify equation 2, our initial fixed effects estimation, and specify the first stage of 
FEVD in the context of this paper as: 
 
7iltililtilt aXDO µξζ +++=  
 
Equation 7 drops the time invariant component. It is prudent to note that unlike equation 5 of 
HT the generated residuals from equation 7 do not include the time invariant explanatory 
variables. Equation 8 specifies the second stage that decomposes the residuals into observed 
time invariant factors and error component. 
 
8ˆ ililil ηβλγµ ++=
 
 
Where gamma (γ) is the intercept and eta (η) is the unexplained part.  
 
With the same symbols as in the earlier equations, the third stage pooled least squares 
regression takes the form: 
 
9iltilililtilt XDO εηβλξα ++++=  
 
Finally, we compare our estimates from the above estimation with the nested error 
components models due to the multi-level characterization of our dataset. From an error 
component perspective we can decompose the multi-category potential effect as: 
 
  
 
10ittjiltitit XDO εµψηβλξα ++++++=  
 
Specification of equation 10 above suggests that estimating the functional relationship 
between governance indicators and microfinance objectives could potentially be affected by 
institutional (η), country (ψ) and time (µ) effects. Correlation between any of these errors and 
the vector of governance indicators (λ) will lead to endogeneity. In the previous estimation 
we concentrated on the institution effect,hence we need to test the robustness of our estimates 
in the context of time and country level. The presence of ‘age of microfinance institution’ on 
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the right-hand side of the equation (estimable) subsumes the effect of time and this leads to 
consistent coefficients whether or not time dummies are included in the model. Since we are 
only controlling for the effect of the error and not trying to estimate jψ ,
 
taking the time-
demeaning within each unique MFI-country (spell) generates consistent estimators of the 
time varying coefficients (ξ and β) (Andrews, Schank and Upward, 2006).  
 
 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
We posit two specific hypotheses on the relationship between governance and the dual 
objectives of MFIs: (1) external governance is better placed to enable MFIs to achieve their 
poverty lending objective than are internal governance systems; and (2) internal governance 
systems coupled with better operational performance are sufficient for the financial 
sustainability objective of MFIs. 
 
The primary governance variables used in this paper are regulation (internal) and property 
rights, enforcement of contract, and voice and accountability (external). We also control for 
the effect of credit information and operations.  
 
Tables 2a and 2b provide a descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study.  
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Table 2a 
 
Descriptive Statistics – Yearly Data 
 
Variables 
2004 2005 2006 2007 
N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Depth of Out. 213 69.82    83.08       221 63.20 71.28 218 72.63 124.67 205 79.29 157.20 
Return on 
Assets 
214   1.31    15.77    211 2.51  10.30   220 2.58 8.22 206 2.96 7.34 
Portfolio at 
Risk 
194 5.69    9.50        202 6.01 9.14 204 5.96 11.18 196 5.37 10.09 
Log of gross 
loan portfolio 
217 15.05    1.88    220 15.34 1.69 221 15.69 1.70 208 16.14 1.89 
Operating 
Expense/GLP 
214 31.38    31.93          213 28.79 25.11 221 26.74 21.07 206 23.15 17.88 
Cost Per 
Borrower 
214 127.53    124.24          214 127.41 119.68 220 141.58 168.77 204 153.34 172.26 
Yield on GLP 
Nominal 
152 38.22    17.03       172 36.31 16.51 201 34.61 17.20 199 32.48 15.84 
Products 221 0.64 0.47 221 0.64 0.47 221 0.64 0.47 221 0.64 0.47 
Age of 
Institution 
221 9.70    6.51          221 10.70 6.51 221 11.70 6.51 221 12.70 6.51 
Regulated 221 0.62    0.49          221 0.62 0.49 221 0.62 0.49 221 0.62 0.49 
Voice and 
Accountability 
221 - 0.35 0.51 221 - 0.37 0.52 221 - 0.33 0.54 221 - 0.36 0.57 
Time for 
Property 
Registration 
- - - 219 104.82 136.35 219 105.01 136.45 221 95.97 111.02 
Procedures  for 
Contract 
Enforcement 
208 39.22 3.65 219 39.01 3.62 219 39.00 3.62 221 38.88 3.68 
Credit Info. 
Index 
- - - 216 2.12 2.04 219 2.37 2.03 221 2.75 2.09 
No. of Active 
Borrowers 
218 44613 254303 221 59102 348806 220 71019 428337 205 87714 475643 
Yield on GLP 
Real 
152 31.023 14.601 172 27.772 15.028 201 26.495 15.890 199 34.477 145.56 
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Table 2b 
Descriptive Statistics – Panel Data 
 
Variables 
Mean Standard Deviation Observations 
   
Depth of Out. 
                                
Overall         
Between 
Within  
71.094 113.480 
82.430 
77.766 
N = 857 
n = 221 
T-bar = 3.877 
Return on Assets Overall         
Between 
Within  
2.337 10.923 
9.350 
5.689 
N = 851 
n = 221 
T-bar = 3.851 
Portfolio at Risk Overall         
Between 
Within  
5.763 9.998 
8.554 
6.117 
N = 796 
n = 217 
T-bar = 3.668 
Log of gross loan 
portfolio 
Overall         
Between 
Within  
15.547 1.833 
1.734 
0.626 
N = 866 
n = 221 
T-bar = 3.919 
Operating 
Expense/GLP 
Overall         
Between 
Within  
27.548 24.730 
23.474 
9.435 
N = 854 
n = 221 
T-bar = 3.864 
Cost Per Borrower Overall         
Between 
Within  
137.305 148.230 
132.382 
65.567 
N = 852 
n = 221 
T-bar = 3.855 
Yield on GLP 
Nominal 
Overall         
Between 
Within  
35.189 16.729 
16.421 
5.807 
N = 724 
n = 208 
T-bar = 3.877 
Products Between 
Overall         
Within  
0.674 0.469 
0.470 
0 
N = 884 
n = 221 
T-bar = 4  
Age of Institution Overall         
Between 
Within  
11.201 6.598 
6.514 
1.119 
N = 884 
n = 221 
T-bar = 4 
Regulated Overall         
Between 
Within  
0.620 0.486 
0.487 
0 
N = 884 
n = 221 
T-bar = 4 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Overall         
Between 
Within  
- 0.354 0.536 
0.528 
0.981 
N = 884 
n = 221 
T-bar = 4 
Time – Property 
Registration 
Overall         
Between 
Within  
101.914 128.324 
125.255 
27.497 
N = 659 
n = 221 
T-bar = 2.982 
Procedures for 
Contract 
Enforcement 
Overall         
Between 
Within  
39.025 3.638 
3.614 
0.408 
N = 867 
n = 221 
T-bar = 3.923 
Credit Info. Index Overall         
Between 
Within  
2.415 2.069 
1.991 
0.569 
N = 656 
n = 221 
T-bar = 2.968 
Number of Active 
Borrowers 
Overall         
Between 
Within  
65269.25 384135.80 
370526.40 
87395.42 
N = 864 
n = 221 
T-bar = 3.910 
Yield on Gross 
Loan Portfolio Real 
Overall         
Between 
29.945 77.335 
48.981 
N = 724 
n = 208 
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Within 62.478 T-bar = 3.481 
 
The analytical discussion compares coefficients emerging from estimating five different 
econometric techniques, namely: pooled; fixed; random; HT and FEVD. The estimations are 
done for both the financial and social objectives of MFIs.  
 
We observe two broad patterns consistent with the hypothesis of the paper. Firstly, external 
governance indicators significantly affect the proxy for depth of poverty in all five 
estimations. Secondly, with the exception of FEVD, most of the institution operational 
variables fail to explain MFIs’ reach of poorer clients. These two observations provide the 
initial basis from which to argue that MFIs’ willingness to achieve the social mission of 
reaching poorer clients necessarily requires the role of an external institution.  
 
The pooled estimates represented in Column 2 of Table 3 shows consistent results with the 
random effects estimation. However, the underlying assumption of homogenous MFI and 
country-level effects might lead to bias estimates. This is likely to generate omitted variable 
bias leading to endogeneity. In the post-estimation tests of Table 5, we observe that the test of 
poolability fails using both F-test of fixed effects and Lagrange multiplier for random effects.  
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Table 3 
Regression Analysis – Dependent Variable: Average Loan Size/GNIpc 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pool Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Hausman-
Taylor 
Fixed Effects 
Vector 
Decomposition 
Return on 
Assets 
  - 0.37 
 (1.54) 
- 5.88** 
(2.32) 
- 1.60 
(1.57) 
- 5.85** 
(2.30) 
- 5.88*** 
(1.18) 
Portfolio at 
Risk 
1.01 
(0.78) 
0.59 
(1.21) 
0.85 
(0.86) 
0.13 
(1.06) 
0.59 
(0.66) 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio 
10.59* 
(5.67) 
10.56 
(21.67) 
10.72** 
(5.38) 
- 0.45 
(10.67) 
10.56*** 
(3.66) 
Operating 
Expense 
- 0.12 
(0.66) 
- 3.89*** 
(1.36) 
- 0.66 
(0.94) 
- 3.01** 
(1.32) 
- 3.89*** 
(0.73) 
Cost per 
Borrower 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
0.17 
(0.10) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.17*** 
(0.03) 
Yield on Gross 
Loan Portfolio 
0.67 
(1.48) 
-1.11 
(1.37) 
0.95 
(0.91) 
1.04 
(1.26) 
- 1.11 
(0.70) 
Age of 
Institution 
0.01 
(0.80) 
7.17 
(10.63) 
0.14 
(1.20) 
2.48 
(2.20) 
7.17*** 
(0.83) 
Product 
Diversification 
6.64 
(12.65) 
- 4.28 
(15.30) 
12.61 
(26.48) 
- 30.55*** 
(9.76) 
Regulated 36.27*** 
(7.96) 
- 36.68** 
(16.10) 
74.02** 
(33.69) 
17.34* 
(10.13) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
15.20 
(11.50) 
- 13.47 
(52.95) 
15.26 
(14.60) 
- 38.19 
(43.62) 
15.62 
(9.68) 
Property 
Rights 
0.12 
(0.13) 
0.76*** 
(0.16) 
0.15*** 
(0.05) 
0.66*** 
(0.15) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Enforcement of 
Contract 
   - 3.69*** 
(0.89) 
- 1.21 
(26.25) 
- 3.96* 
(2.13) 
- 34.58** 
(14.76) 
- 7.24*** 
(1.38) 
Credit 
Information 
  - 13.14*** 
(3.33) 
- 7.37 
(8.75) 
- 12.77*** 
(3.71) 
- 14.84** 
 (6.50) 
- 20.63*** 
(2.53) 
Eta - - - - 1.00*** 
(0.05) 
Constant 8.18 
(85.15) 
268.260 
(1065.99) 
24.91 
(114.30) 
1354.35 
(574.35) 
621.49*** 
(79.82) 
Robust Standards Errors (in parenthesis)                             *** One percent ** five percent & * ten percent 
 
In estimating both fixed and random effects we initially consider one error correction model 
in spite of the potential effect of time and country level. We justify the restriction of the 
estimation to only microfinance-specific effect errors, based on the following: firstly, the 
inclusion of age of institution appeared to be correlated with time effect. Secondly, we 
explore the country-level effect only as a post-estimation analysis because estimating the 
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extent of effect is not central to the focus of the current paper. The defining variation of 
exogeneity for random effects and some amount of correlation between unit-specific effects 
and the explanatory variables of fixed effects led to the observation of marked difference in 
the coefficients between the estimations. Worth mentioning initially was the expected 
inability of fixed effects to estimate the time invariant variables, that is regulation and 
product diversification. While the random effect offered results for all the governance 
indicators, the Hausman test of Table 5, showed that random effects coefficients were not 
consistent and had biases which can be attributed to endogeneity.  
 
This finding justifies the choice of a fixed effect related estimation technique such as HT or 
FEVD. Column 4 of Table 3 shows the ability of HT in estimating time invariant variables. 
This however is not without a cost on the efficiency of the coefficients. Inspecting all the 
estimations it is clearly evident that HT had the largest standard errors implying a 
compromise on the efficiency of our coefficients. Up to this point, however, it is the HT 
model that offers preferred results that are consistent with the hypothesis and findings from 
previous literature. For instance, regulation shows a positive association with average loan 
size and has been justified by the argument that prudential regulation leads to higher loan 
sizes. This finding is consistent with recent empirical studies on this issue (Hartaska and 
Nadolnyak (2007), Mersland and Strøm (2009) and Cull et al. (2009)). However, FEVD hints 
at a possible reversal of this wave of emerging evidence as it shows that the positive 
association is significant only at 10 per cent alpha level. The outcome can be associated with 
the capability of FEVD in capturing the time invariant specific effects at the second stage, as 
shown in equation 8.  
 
Despite variations in GNIpc, the coefficient of property rights in Table 3 points to a positive 
association between duration for property registration and larger loan amounts. In this context 
MFIs will argue that greater duration increases their operational cost, making lending in 
smaller amounts more expensive for clients and as such unprofitable. Barring all the ifs 
associated with this potential transmission mechanism between property rights and reaching 
poorer clients, this finding suggests a need to reduce duration for registering a property to 
enable MFIs to achieve the poverty reduction objective. In a reverse fashion the coefficient of 
contract enforcement depicts a negative association between the number of procedures in 
enforcing a contract and average loan size. Based on Williamson’s (2000) arguments, 
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although hierarchy of institutions makes the contract enforcement cumbersome it does 
facilitate targeting poorer clients. While we acknowledge the multiplicity of reasons that can 
be offered for the respective signs associated with the effect of property rights and 
enforcement of contracts on reaching poorer clients, the significant coefficients provide 
enough justification for country-specific studies. Against Williamson’s assertion that 
“different kinds of transactions call for different governance structures” (cited on p.7, The 
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2009) the country-specific studies will explore the 
exact transmission mechanisms between these governance indicators and the microfinance 
objective of reaching poorer clients. 
 
Since poorer clients are better reached in an environment with less information asymmetry 
between borrowers and MFIs, the negative sign associated with credit information is 
consistent with our a priori expectations. Cull et al. (2009), basing their argument on 
economic theory, suggest that asymmetry information related problems hinder MFIs’ quest 
for serving the under-served. 
 
The variable ‘Eta’ of Table 3 captures the unexplained term of equation 8, and its 
significance suggests that errors associated with the time invariant and slow changing 
governance indicators are significant. This partially explains the relatively larger standard 
errors of the other estimations especially the HT estimation. In this regard, the FEVD 
estimate offers much more efficient results compared with all other estimations as it tends to 
offer smaller standard errors.  
 
Table 4 examines the effect of the same set of explanatory variables as in Table 3 on MFIs’ 
return on assets. In contrast to reaching poorer clients, we observe that most of the 
governance indicators are not significant for all the estimations. However, all the operational 
variables are significant in explaining return on assets of MFIs. From the coefficient for the 
FEVD estimation in Table 4, it is observed that regulation significantly affects MFIs’ 
performance. Again this finding with the FEVD is in contrast to earlier microfinance-
governance empirical research (Hartaska and Nadolnyak (2007); Mersland and Strøm (2009) 
and Cull et al. (2009)). The respective observations of significant relationships between 
operational issues and regulation on MFIs’ performance uphold the second hypothesis. While 
voice and accountability and contract enforcement appear significant in the FEVD estimation 
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we hesitate in attributing a justification for the observation as it does not emerge consistently 
with other earlier estimations.  
Table 4 
 
Regression Analysis – Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pool Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Hausman-
Taylor 
Fixed Effects  
Vector 
Decomposition 
Average Loan 
Size/GNIpc 
- 0.00 
(0.00) 
- 0.00** 
(0.00) 
- 0.00* 
(0.00) 
- 0.00*** 
0.00 
- 0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Portfolio at Risk - 0.14*** 
(0.05) 
- 0.16*** 
(0.03) 
- 0.15*** 
(0.02) 
- 0.16*** 
(0.02) 
- 0.16*** 
(0.02) 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio 
- 0.50*** 
(0.13) 
- 1.16** 
(0.52) 
- 0.55*** 
(0.17) 
- 0.71*** 
(0.26) 
- 1.16*** 
(0.09) 
Operating Expense - 0.54*** 
(0.03) 
- 0.48*** 
(0.02) 
- 0.51*** 
(0.01) 
- 0.51*** 
(0.01) 
- 0.48*** 
(0.01) 
Cost per Borrower -  0.00*** 
(0.00) 
- 0.00 
(0.00) 
- 0.00** 
(0.00) 
- 0.00 
(0.00) 
- 0.00 
(0.00) 
Yield on Gross 
Loan Portfolio 
0.48*** 
(0.03) 
0.39*** 
(0.02) 
0.44*** 
(0.12) 
0.41*** 
(0.02) 
0.39*** 
(0.01) 
Age of Institution 0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.18 
(0.26) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.18*** 
(0.02) 
Product 
Diversification 
- 0.26 
(0.37) 
- - 0.14 
(0.51) 
0.43 
(0.96) 
- 0.20 
(0.23) 
Regulated 0.56 
(0.38) 
- 0.51 
(0.54) 
- 0.40 
(4.74) 
1.14*** 
(0.24) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
- 0.10 
(0.39) 
- 0.88 
(1.27) 
- 0.07 
(0.46) 
- 1.17 
(1.05) 
- 0.53** 
(0.23) 
Property Rights 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Enforcement of 
Contract 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
0.45 
(0.63) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
- 0.02 
(0.47) 
0.10** 
(0.03) 
Credit Information - 0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.23 
(0.21) 
- 0.11 
(0.11) 
- 0.33* 
(0.18) 
0.04 
(0.61) 
Eta - - - - 1.00*** 
(0.03) 
Constant 4.92 
(3.00) 
1.62 
(25.60) 
5.74 
(3.68) 
13.58 
(16.98) 
14.35*** 
(1.81) 
Robust Standards Errors (in parenthesis)                             *** One percent ** five percent & * ten percent 
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Table 5 
Post Estimation Results 
 
 
Test 
Pool Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Hausman-
Taylor 
Fixed Effects  
Vector 
Decomposition 
Poolability X √ √ - - 
Hausman (FE and RE) - √ X - - 
Hausman (FE and XTHT) - X - √ - 
Serial Correlation - X - - - 
Joint Significance of Gov. Ind. - √ - - - 
Country Level Effect - √ - - - 
Over Identification of Ins. - - - √ - 
 
 
The robustness of our estimates is summarized in Table 5. The joint significance of the 
governance indicators is empirically verified and they emerge significant at five percent. 
Although serial correlation is observed, we quietly estimate the differenced data and signs 
and significant coefficients remain unchanged. Column three of Table 5 shows that after 
controlling for institution-country effect using spell fixed estimation our main covariates 
remain resolute in terms of both significance and direction. However, we have not narrowed 
down specific associations that will help identify possible transmission mechanisms between 
each of the different types of governance process and multiple objectives of MFIs. This, from 
our perspective, requires country-specific analysis due to heterogeneity of country-level 
governance structures.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In lieu of the inconclusive empirical evidence in support of MFIs’ ability to achieve the win-
win objective of poverty reduction and financial sustainability, the wider positive effect of the 
microfinance paradigm is revealing and diverse. Hence it is important to identify both 
internal and external factors that will further contribute to the success of MFIs. In this paper, 
we investigate the effect of external governance on the poverty and financial objectives of 
MFIs. The study rationalizes a case for external governance in achieving poverty reduction 
and other social objectives of microfinance.  
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Two broad conclusions emerge from the study. First, unlike operational outcomes such as 
interest rate and operating expenses, external governance indicators fail to cause changes in 
the profitability of MFIs. Secondly, and in an opposite fashion, external governance 
indicators emerge as significant variables for the poverty reduction objective of MFIs. 
Specifically, shorter duration in registering a property has the potential to reduce 
transactional costs, which in turn is expected to enable institutions to target poorer clients. 
Availability of credit information also leads to reaching poorer clients. 
 
The study offers useful policy recommendations specifically for the microfinance objective 
of reaching poorer clients. Both empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that existing 
involvement in microfinance operational issues by the government and other agencies, 
including retail financial and interest rate capping, have failed. We prescribe a faster 
procedure to expedite the process of securing property; conducting institutional ratings and 
expanding credit information bureaus, and lastly establishing the confidence of the poor in 
institutions. While the latter is not a direct outcome of the current study, we deem it a 
necessary condition for tapping the benefits likely to be generated from a well-structured set 
of institutions in any economy. 
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